Essay --

When Osama Bin Laden was killed by US navy blue Seals in May 2011, strategists of the world took notice . While this incident was of salient importance to an appargonntly stagnant global war on terror, the occurrence that the mastermind behind the insurgent juggernaut al Qaida was able to extend inside a supposed allys borders is of far pointrel concern. Regardless if Pakistan was complicit in or ignorant of Bin Ladens sanctuary, Pakistan proved they are incapable of policing their borders to a level that satisfies the world community. US intelligence officials estimate Pakistan has anywhere from 110-200 nuclear weapons . According to George Tenet, the most fourth-year leaders of al Qaida are still singularly foc expendd on acquiring WMD weapons of mass destruction. Allowing an insurgency with nuclear ambitions to flourish is inexcusable. As the war in Afghanistan winds down, the insurgent threat in the region is not going away. Irregular conflict will continue and the area where the US and its allies need to pay particular attention is Pakistan. Our dodging should be a globally unified effort to strengthen the Pakistani certificate structure while removing any potential source of an insurgency. To combat the likely difficulties in implementing this strategy we must focus on not passing our strategic goals, embrace unity of effort as the only message to winning, and we must remain flexible in an unknown future.There are a number of obstacles that threaten to make implementing such a strategy either ineffective or im doable. Professor Colin Gray from the Centre for protective cover Studies at the University of Hull discussed such sources of encumbrance in 1999. He argued three reasons as to why it is difficult to do strategy well First, its actually na... ...ture is to accept that it is unknown, and focus the unified effort on the worst possible scenario. In the case of Pakistan, that worst case scenario is obvious insurgents getting a WMD. This nuclear threat might be the catalyst that drives competing agencies to look beyond their differences towards a very clear and common goal. Gray concludes his article with this monitor lizard to future strategists You do not have to win elegantly you notwithstanding have to win. If our strategists remained focused on winning we can hopefully incapacitate the inevitable difficulties in doing strategy well. If we do not let the difficulty of such a lofty goal limit our strategic goals, if we use the dire consequences of failure to force competent unity of effort and we gullt let an unknown future distract us from the principal(a) goal, it is entirely possible that we can indeed win in Pakistan.